In Ulan-Ude, “dacha” routes will begin operating from May 1. – Russia today Posting in CHAT: Russia This year, the “dacha season” of operation of 14 city roads in the capital of Buryatia has been extended by two weeks – from May 1 to October 15 inclusive, the Transport Committee reported. City buses will run on routes No. 2 “Dachny”, 2a, 11 “Dachny”, 12 “Dachny”, 16 “Dachny”, 22, 31 “Dachny”, 31a, 32, 37 “Dachny”, 39, 122, 122k , 131 from May 1 to October 15, 2024. For elderly pensioners on “dacha routes” there will be a discounted travel pass, the cost of which is 450 rubles for one month. The cost of one trip on country roads is 30 rubles. You can purchase discounted tickets for travel on country roads at city kiosks at the following addresses: “Veta-press”, st. Kuibysheva, 3 (Gorsad stop); Stroiteley Ave., 18 (Pochtovaya stop); St. Tereshkova 24a/1 (Sayany stop); St. Tereshkova, 11 (Republican Hospital stop); "Vesti", st. Gagarina, 25 (elevator stop); St. Klyuchevskaya, 40/1 (rest interior); St. Tulaeva, 134b (stop Melkombinat); St. Stolichnaya, 8 (stop “Mashzavod”); St. Chkalova, 6 (Eastern stop); Checkpoint in SNT "Vesna" and in the control room of the GPU Enterprise "Urba Itineros" at the address: Avtomobilistov Ave. 3A. When purchasing a “dacha” ticket, you must present a passport and pension certificate. The travel ticket is valid for one month and allows you to travel an unlimited number of times. Source link Source link
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В Улан-Удэ с 1 мая начнут работать «дачные» маршруты.
В этом году "дачный сезон" эксплуатации 14 городских дорог столицы Бурятии продлен на две недели - с 1 мая по 15 октября включительно, сообщили в Комитете по транспорту. Городские автобусы будут курсировать по маршрутам № 2 «Дачный», 2а, 11 «Дачный», 12 «Дачный», 16 «Дачный», 22, 31 «Дачный», 31а, 32, 37 «Дачный», 39, 122, 122к, 131 с 1 мая по 15 октября 2024 года. Для пожилых пенсионеров на «дачных маршрутах» будет действовать льготный проездной, стоимость которого составляет 450 рублей на один месяц. Стоимость одной поездки по проселочным дорогам — 30 рублей. Приобрести льготные билеты для проезда по загородным дорогам можно в киосках города по адресам: «Вета-пресс», ул. Куйбышева, 3 (остановка Горсад); пр. Строителей, 18 (Почтовая остановка); Св. Терешкова 24а/1 (остановка Саяны); Св. Терешкова, 11 (остановка Республиканская больница); «Вести», ул. Гагарина, 25 (остановка лифта); Св. Ключевская, 40/1 (ост. интерьер); Св. Тулаева, 134б (остановка Мелькомбинат); Св. Столичная, 8 (остановка «Машзавод»); Св. Чкалова, 6 (Восточная остановка); КПП в СНТ «Весна» и в диспетчерской ГПУ Предприятие «Урба Итинерос» по адресу: пр-т Автомобилистов. 3А. При покупке «дачного» билета необходимо предъявить паспорт и пенсионное удостоверение. Проездной билет действителен в течение одного месяца и дает право путешествовать неограниченное количество раз. Source link
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Is the arrest of Timur Ivanov a black mark for Shoigu? Or help so that Kuzhugetovich is not distracted from saving the Motherland. Marat Khairullin Posting in CHAT: Russia The arrest of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov literally blew up the entire Russian Internet - what is behind this? There are two main versions. The first is betrayal. The second is a black mark for Defense Minister Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu. Let's try to find out how true each of them is. Moreover, over the past 24 hours, enough facts have accumulated (I would even say small touches), invisible to a wide range of people, by which one can judge the content of this case. So, let's start with the first version. The motive of betrayal is clearly present, because the military counterintelligence of the FSB, which was involved in this case, is not involved in construction. Another thing is that we are not talking about pure betrayal (in the criminal sense of the term). Rather, we are talking about a kind of general loyalty, where everything is built on halftones. This is a special “friend or foe” internal security system, built by Putin’s team, which grew up in conditions of constant erosion of the coordinates and goals of national policy by the Western comprador lobby. Positioning in this internal system of “friend or foe” is a marker that is constantly present in all high-profile cases of this kind in recent years. This Jesuitical and non-public system, aimed at justice for the system of power being built by Putin, is a direct reaction to the equally complex and very cunning policy of the West aimed at destroying our statehood. The Prigozhin case is very typical in this regard. Outwardly, Prigozhin always seemed to support Russia and positioned himself as a super-patriot, but under this mask he took such actions that he almost destroyed our entire front. I have written more than once that Prigozhin’s rebellion very successfully coincided with Dill’s counter-offensive. How did this happen? It is quite reasonable that Prigozhin was manipulated by his entourage in the interests of the enemy. This is the main mechanism of the West's influence on our internal structure. Agents of influence with “soft feet” penetrate the circles of key officials in order to pull the trigger at the right moment. How it happened with Prigozhin. In addition, in his case, the enemies even managed to create a zone of invisibility around the object: police and intelligence officers were clearly not allowed into the territory controlled by Wagner. This, too, is the work of a disloyal environment, which, perhaps for a moment, did not even suspect that it was acting in openly hostile interests. An even more typical example is a series of criminal cases surrounding Dmitry Medvedev in the period after his resignation from the post of prime minister. The Magomedov case, the case of the so-called “chess mafia”, the resignation and removal of Dvorkovich, Tkachev. Then a serious purge was carried out among his circle of agents of influence. If we talk about some of Ivanov’s Dagestan roots (and continue the line with the Magomedovs), then everything here is even more revealing. Governor Abdulatipov and his daughter’s husband, who fled to the west (now the owner of Forbes magazine). Oligarch Suleiman Kerimov and his long-term partner and assistant to State Duma deputy Gadzhiev left for the West. Please note: Medvedev, Abdulatipov and Kerimov remain at large. This means that from the point of view of the “friend or foe” system built by Putin, they still remained loyal to the Russian state. Indeed, this is exactly what we are seeing today with the arrest of Ivanov. It cannot be said without a doubt that now faith in Sergei Kuzhugetovich will be undermined. Yes, apparently, agents of Western influence have infiltrated his circle. As before, they penetrated the circle of many Russian officials. Shoigu, as the head of the relevant ministry, ensures our victory on the battlefield, and it would be strange if an intelligent, powerful and ultra-insidious enemy did not try to somehow influence him as one of the most important instruments of our common cause. victory Now let us pay attention to how specifically General Ivanov was arrested. He was brought to the trial in uniform, in fact taken to the board of the Ministry of Defense. In a very similar way, for example, the Arashukovs were arrested, who tried to keep entire armies of guards around them, like Prigozhin and Ivanov. Let me remind you that when they took Arashukov Jr., they stopped communication and blocked the entire Federation Council. Well, that is, they clearly understood who they were dealing with. It is obvious that Potapa has been in Ivanov’s ear for more than a year. And, for example, the fact that Ivanov was taken with a bribe of a million rubles indicates that he and his entourage have already received 150 and one warning for correction. But the Ivanovs stupidly ignored them. Now about corruption. If we talk about a certain collective Putin, then we must understand that although the conventional fight against corruption is still a priority of our government management team, its understanding and priorities in eradicating it have undergone significant evolution. Our country is mercilessly fighting so-called socially significant corruption - this is when citizens as a whole directly suffer from bribes. Here it comes quickly, inevitably and openly. But when it comes to the elites, Putin's managers have learned the hard way that if you mow down everyone using the same algorithm, the system will break down very quickly. Do you know, for example, why the public arrests of governors stopped? Because, as if in spirit, they ousted everyone who shared their fate with them, and the task of total cleansing of the region arose. Everyone had to be imprisoned. And who should work? And the second point: the governors, who had not yet been attacked, got wildly scared and lost the initiative. But for the region this means one thing - economic indicators are creeping down. That is why now they are trying not to imprison governors and other business entities, but simply fire them - this is more useful for the economy. I repeat, in this case there is only one prison marker - general disloyalty to our state. That is, if an official steals as a loyalist to the country, he is exposed and sent to retirement. In extreme cases, his plane will land in the wrong place—Prigozhin also has this option in his arsenal. In any case, the officials themselves firmly believe in this - well, thank God, because it helps them keep themselves in check. It’s more difficult with the security forces. If, for example, we are talking about a certain police general, then he will most likely be publicly exposed and all his golden toilets will be shown, because the people understand that he stole these toilets from them on purpose. In the case of Ivanov, there will definitely not be such a resonance, because the economic flows from which he feeds are closed and non-public. And to publicly expose the depth to which the general has delved into the budget means to undermine the entire system. Besides, we already had bitter experience. Both Serdyukov and Vasilyeva, compared to Ivanov, are high school students. Let us take as an example the case of a small military garrison assembler. It had to be dug up, repaired and buried again. The builders honestly dug it out, but did not repair it, just painted it a little, and then honestly buried it. So the criminal case against this collector already totaled 350 volumes. And the costs of endless inspections and damage to the normal functioning of the garrison are approaching the costs of the collector himself. At the same time, the builders are frankly surprised: why repair it? In the Soviet years, they knew how to build it so that it would last for another thousand years? It's better not to break it with modern repairs. This may be true, but this should be mentioned before picking up the goods. Why am I doing all this? In addition, there is definitely corruption in Ivanov’s case, but we most likely will not see the full depth of “this Mariana Trench.” And we will see only that same million (as my good friend said, a million of what?) One of the most effective examples of the fight against corruption was shown in his time by Viktor Zolotov, when he was almost imprisoned without much fuss. thirty generals inherited by the Russian Guard from the VV. It got to the point that some of the generals taken out of the trough paid for Navalny’s jeans. But Zolotov still completed the task of cleaning the new department from internal corruption. Although some corrupt officials continued to evade arrest and were simply fired. And this is with the personal resources that Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov has. In other words, Ivanov’s arrest is, of course, a purge of a key department from possible (or already existing) agents of influence. And part of the planned work to clean up corruption in the elite environment. Do you know what is the most obvious sign that Ivanov’s arrest (in the context of the fight against corruption) is primarily prevention? The connection through which he was detained is an organized criminal group with an unknown number of people. Can…