counterintelligence

How Finnish Spies Could Escape Soviet Counterintelligence – Russia Today Publication in CHAT: Russia In 1942, there was almost no active combat on the Soviet-Finnish front. However, the Finns' reconnaissance and sabotage activities noticeably intensified. Since 1943, the Finns changed their tactics. After the defeat of Colonel Toivonen's sabotage group (about a hundred people), large detachments were no longer deployed; small strike groups were now sent to the rear of the Karelian Front, which were quickly discovered and eliminated by NKVD units and military units. But there were also failures, when saboteurs managed not only to evade pursuit for weeks, continue to collect and transmit intelligence, but also eventually escaped safely. One such case will be discussed in this article. It was one of the biggest failures of SMERSH and the NKVD. On the night of June 16, 1943, a Finnish seaplane flew low over Lake Onega and landed an eight-man assault reconnaissance group in the Vologda area. This was done unnoticed; the landing was not recorded. Judging by the subsequent route, they were interested in military units and defensive structures in the triangle of settlements Pudozh-Vytegra-Annensky Bridge. For five days, the strike group covertly moved along the planned route, transmitting intelligence twice a day. The areas there are rather remote, impassable forests and swamps, they did not enter villages, moving mainly at night; Consequently, the saboteurs remained unnoticed until 9 p.m. On this day, three saboteurs dressed in Soviet uniforms decided to conduct reconnaissance of the area around the village of Pustynka. One of them was noticed by soldiers of the unit stationed in the village. However, when a patrol was sent to check, the saboteurs opened fire, killing one Red Army soldier. They managed to escape, but the incident was reported to the NKVD of Vytegra. At first they decided that it was a small group (no more than five people) of paratroopers, and sent about eight dozen people from the combat battalion and security forces in the direction. . find and remove them. They were divided into three groups, but due to the lack of coordination between them, three days of searching yielded no results. In the meantime, counterintelligence recorded the transmitter's regular operation. It became clear that a reconnaissance and sabotage group was operating. Direction finders were registered. Since the radio traffic was quite intense and stable, the location of the broadcast was determined without problems. But in the difficult terrain, the saboteurs constantly eluded pursuit. They nevertheless moved to the settlement of Annensky Most. At the same time, they continued to collect information, connect to telephone lines and listen to them. Everything necessary for continuing the activity was dropped from airplanes. On the twelfth day of the attack, the group captured and killed the investigator of the Cherepovets military prosecutor's office, Shelomakin. Information about this is sent to Moscow. They demand daily reports on the progress of the operation from there; the authorities are indignant that the group of saboteurs has been roaming the rear with impunity for almost two weeks. On the 30th, the command of the operation is entrusted directly to the head of counterintelligence of the 7th Army, Colonel Dobrovolsky, and the head of the Vologda Directorate of the NKGB, Colonel Galkin. All forces of the NKVD, military counterintelligence SMERSH, and military units are involved in the search. After another capture of the warehouse, the closest unit to the transfer site turned out to be a group of marines. However, the chase, which lasted almost a day, ended in a shootout (the Finns fired at the marines from an ambush), after which the saboteurs, abandoning some of their equipment, broke free. However, research activities had to be limited. Search groups were literally on their heels. Already on the second day of the month, one of them under the command of Khromov practically destroyed the resting saboteurs. However, they managed to break free again. Two days later, they were caught six kilometers from Lake Kovzhskoye. After a fierce firefight, in which the pursuers suffered losses, the Finns left again. However, it turned out that they were heading for Lake Kovzhskoye with its numerous tributaries and bays, quite suitable for landing a seaplane. Search groups were concentrated in the most likely places of its appearance. In the following days, the Finns made attempts to land the seaplane on various lakes, but they all ended in failure. One seaplane was captured. After interrogating the pilots, it was possible to establish that the group's attack lasted 19 days. In the evening of the same day, a Messerschmitt appeared over one of the lakes. Two rockets were launched from the ground, and it dropped the payload. Unfortunately, instead of calmly proceeding to the landing site, the search party fired upon it, and the saboteurs disappeared again. Ilya Petrovich Dobrovolsky and Lev Fedorovich Galkin The group was able to find the direction again on July 9. But another absurd incident occurred. According to the report, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the SMERSH group under the command of Captain Popkov was only one and a half meters from the Finns. Popkov, noticing movement in the bushes, fired (as it later turned out, at a black grouse), prematurely discovering his group. The saboteurs immediately opened fire on them. Popkov was wounded in the leg, and the Finns left again. Popkov explained his actions as a mistake. However, no special claims were made against him regarding his injury. As a result, the next day, the Finnish saboteurs reached Lake Yamsor, from where they were picked up by seaplane. The operation, in which half a thousand scouts (not counting the units of combat battalions) participated, ended in failure. There is a version that the Finns had their own people among the leaders who were aware of the progress of the operation, thanks to which they managed to avoid persecution all the time. But, most likely, a simple underestimation of the enemy at the initial stage and some unforeseen accidents that occurred when the liquidation was carried out in earnest also played a role. Source link Source link